Arbeitspapier
Fiscal Aspects of Central Bank Independence
Most macroeconomic models treat the central bank and the trea-sury as a unified entity. The balance sheet of the central bank is therefore implicitly treated as an accounting fiction. While this is often realistic, the central bank balance sheet has implications for central bank independence. There are wide differences in the nature of central bank balance sheets today, with the US and ESCB balance sheets nearly at the extremes. The reasons for and implications of these differences are studied here.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 547
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Sims, Christopher A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sims, Christopher A.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2001
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