Arbeitspapier
Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of “Shrinkage” Estimators
Researchers commonly “shrink” raw quality measures based on statistical criteria. This paper studies when and how this transformation’s statistical properties would confer economic benefits to a utility-maximizing decisionmaker across common asymmetric information environments. I develop the results for an application measuring teacher quality. The presence of a systematic relationship between teacher quality and class size could cause the data transformation to do either worse or better than the untransformed data. I use data from Los Angeles to confirm the presence of such a relationship and show that the simpler raw measure would outperform the one most commonly used in teacher incentive schemes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Economics: General
Analysis of Education
Education: Government Policy
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
-
empirical contracts
teacher incentive schemes
teacher quality
economics of education
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mehta, Nirav
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (wo)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mehta, Nirav
- ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Entstanden
- 2018
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: The case of "shrinkage" estimators
Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators
Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: The case of "shrinkage" estimators
Weak versus strong dominance of shrinkage estimators
Essays on Using Shrinkage Estimators in Econometrics
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Incentive Schemes for Local Government
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Design of Incentive Schemes and the New Soviet Incentive Model
The targeted assignment of incentive schemes
Incentive compatible reimbursement schemes for physicians
A simple and successful shrinkage method for weighting estimators of treatment effects
Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: The case of "shrinkage" estimators
Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators
Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: The case of "shrinkage" estimators
Weak versus strong dominance of shrinkage estimators
Essays on Using Shrinkage Estimators in Econometrics
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Incentive Schemes for Local Government
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Design of Incentive Schemes and the New Soviet Incentive Model
The targeted assignment of incentive schemes
Incentive compatible reimbursement schemes for physicians
A simple and successful shrinkage method for weighting estimators of treatment effects
Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: The case of "shrinkage" estimators
Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators
Measuring quality for use in incentive schemes: The case of "shrinkage" estimators
Weak versus strong dominance of shrinkage estimators
Essays on Using Shrinkage Estimators in Econometrics
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Incentive Schemes for Local Government
Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes
Design of Incentive Schemes and the New Soviet Incentive Model
The targeted assignment of incentive schemes
Incentive compatible reimbursement schemes for physicians