Participation and Contract Choice in the Tenancy Market

Arbeitspapier

Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of risk-sharing and moral hazard is far from settled. Moreover, existing empirical study very often plague by selection problem. We address both issues using data from rural Bangladesh. This paper tested a model empirically where the leasing decision and contract choice are simultaneous. A modified Heckman model is estimated which avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts. Empirical tests reject the hypothesis of pure risk sharing and a wide range of support for the presence of moral hazard problem in the choice of contracts.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: EERI Research Paper Series ; No. 04/2012

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
• Subject: Contract choice ; Heckman model ; Moral hazard ; Risk ; Sharecropping

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ahmed, Sharmina ; Findlay, Christopher
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI)
• (where): Brussels
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/142633
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET