Arbeitspapier
Assessing misspecification and aggregation for structured preferences
Applied research often tolerates misspecification in order to reach informative conclusions. We focus on how the degree of misspecification varies with the level of aggregation of data for quasilinear utility models. We present aggregation results formalizing that the model cannot get worse when aggregating. Using scanner data, we find that while all individuals are inconsistent with a quasilinear utility model, we cannot refute the hypothesis that a representative agent is a quasilinear utility maximizer. This provides evidence that deviations from a quasilinear model may average away.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Research Report ; No. 2019-4
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Nutzenmaximierung
Theorie
Modellierung
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Allen, Roy E.
Rehbeck, John
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
- (where)
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London (Ontario)
- (when)
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2019
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Allen, Roy E.
- Rehbeck, John
- The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2019
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