A general framework for studying contests

Konferenzbeitrag

We develop a general framework to study contests, containing the well-known models of Tullock (1980) and Lazear & Rosen (1981) as special cases. The contest outcome depends on players' effort and skill, the latter being subject to symmetric uncertainty. The model is tractable, because a symmetric equilibrium exists under general assumptions regarding production technologies and skill distributions. We construct a link between our contest model and expected utility theory and exploit this link to revisit important comparative statics results of contest theory and show how these can be overturned. Finally, we apply our results to study optimal workforce composition.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Labor Demand ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
• Subject: contest theory ; symmetric equilibrium ; heterogeneity ; risk ; decision theory

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bastani, Spencer ; Giebe, Thomas ; Gürtler, Oliver
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2020

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/224601
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET