Arbeitspapier
Separating Equilibria with Imperfect Certification
Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in separation from top down due to an unraveling process similar to Akerlof (1970). De and Nabar (1991) argue that imperfect certification prevents unraveling so that equilibria with full separation do not exist. This note shows that, if one considers the buyers' buying decision explicitly, a separating equilibrium with imperfect certification does exist.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 324
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Subject
-
certification
unraveling
separating equilibrium
Standardisierung
Adverse Selektion
Konsumentenverhalten
Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Strausz, Roland
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
-
München
- (when)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13230
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13230-7
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Strausz, Roland
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2010
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Imperfect Certification
On the number of critical equilibria separating two equilibria
Imperfect competition in certification markets
Indeterminacy of intertemporal equilibria under imperfect competition
Macroeconomics and imperfect information : uniqueness and calculation of dynamic equilibria
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Wirtschaftspolitiken bei asymmetrischer Information als Resultat der "incentive" Struktur einer Politikinstanz, eine Steuerung der Ökonomie durch "pooling equilibria" oder "separating equilibria"
Identification with imperfect instruments
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