Artikel

Leverage and Risk Taking under Moral Hazard

In this paper, I analyze the effectiveness of different capital regulations in mitigating the effects of moral hazard that exists only for systemically important banks. Leverage restrictions have the potential to reduce the fraction of banks that are systemically important but do not mitigate moral hazard for those that are. Risk adjusted requirements could mitigate moral hazard (of banks with low leverage) but do not affect (endogenous) systemic risk. A combination of both requirements as proposed by the Basel III framework can be successful, although only under restrictive conditions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Journal of Financial Services Research ; ISSN: 1573-0735 ; Volume: 61 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 167-185 ; New York, NY: Springer US

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Subject
Capital regulation
Moral hazard
Leverage

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hott, Christian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer US
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1007/s10693-021-00359-8
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Hott, Christian
  • Springer US

Time of origin

  • 2021

Other Objects (12)