Arbeitspapier

Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality

Unemployment insurance systems include monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wage rates and hours worked, and we examine how often a sanction leads to a lower occupational level. The data cover the Swedish population over 1999-2004. We estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We use weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood to deal with the fact the data register is large whereas observed punishments are rare. We also develop a theoretical job search model with monitoring of job offer rejection vis-a-vis monitoring of job search effort. The observation window includes a policy change in which the punishment severity was reduced. We find that the hourly wage and the number of hours are on average lower after a sanction, and that individuals move more often to a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses. Monitoring offer rejections is less effective than monitoring search effort.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4325

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
Thema
Unemployment
duration
sanction
wage
hours worked
weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood
case worker
job offer
offer rejection
search effort
Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Arbeitsplatzsuchmodell
Anspruchslohn
Arbeitsverhältnis
Schweden

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van den Berg, Gerard J.
Vikström, Johan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2009

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090825646
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van den Berg, Gerard J.
  • Vikström, Johan
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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