Arbeitspapier

Piracy in a two-sided software market

This paper studies the impact of software piracy in a two-sidedmarket setting. Software platforms attract developers and users to maximize their profits. The equilibrium price structure is affected by piracy: license fees to developers are higher with more software protection but the impact on user prices is ambiguous. A conflict between platforms and software developers over software protection may arise: whereas one side benefits from better protection, the other party loses out. Under platform compatibility, this conflict is no longer present.

ISBN
978-3-86304-084-0
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 85

Classification
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Subject
developer
piracy
platform
software
two-sided markets

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Rasch, Alexander
Wenzel, Tobias
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(where)
Düsseldorf
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Rasch, Alexander
  • Wenzel, Tobias
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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