Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary punishment that recipients assign to individual decision makers. We find that pivotal decision makers are punished significantly more for an unpopular voting outcome than non]pivotal decision makers. Our data also suggest that some voters avoid being pivotal by voting strategically in order to delegate the pivotal vote to subsequent decision makers.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 138

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Collective decision making ; responsibility attribution ; voting ; pivotality ; delegation ; experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bartling, Björn ; Fischbacher, Urs ; Schudy, Simeon
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (where): Zurich
• (when): 2015

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5167/uzh-91449
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111194
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET