Arbeitspapier
Optimal relevance in imperfect information games
To help incorporate natural language into economic theory, this paper does two things. First, the paper extends to imperfect information games an equilibrium concept developed for incomplete information games, so natural language can be formalized as a vehicle to convey information about actions as well as types. This equilibrium concept is specific to language games, because information is conveyed by the sender through the message's literal meaning. Second, the paper proposes an equilibrium refinement which selects the sender's most preferred equilibrium. The refinement captures the notion that the speaker seeks to improve its status quo, aiming at optimal relevance. Explicit coordination through verbal communication parallels the idea of implicit coordination through focal points.
- ISBN
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978-987-1062-99-7
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Serie Documentos de Trabajo ; No. 570
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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cheap talk
signs
semantics
pragmatics
relevance
equilibrium selection
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Streb, Jorge M.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
- (where)
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Buenos Aires
- (when)
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2015
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Streb, Jorge M.
- Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
Time of origin
- 2015
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