Risk Taking in Selection Contests

Arbeitspapier

We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small number of contestants, and b) by restricting contestant quality. The results may contribute to our understanding of such diverse phenomena as promotion processes in firms, selection of fund managers and research tournaments.

Object Details

• ISBN: 82-7553-136-5
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Arbeidsnotat ; No. 1999/2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory ; Production and Organizations: Other ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Labor Contracts
• Subject: contest ; risk taking ; selection ; tournament

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hvide, Hans K. ; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Norges Bank
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 1999

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/209768
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET