Arbeitspapier
Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment
Short-term auctions for access to entry terminals of the British gas-network appear to successfully allocate scarce resources and capture scarcity rent. Now long-term auctions are being introduced to guide future capacity expansion decisions. In our model the fraction of rights issued in the long-term auction turns out to be a crucial design parameter. Even a hypothetically optimal parameter choice can in general only satisfy one of three aims: unbiased provision of capacity, full revelation of private information and minimisation of distortions from network effects. The results suggest that long-term auctions for transmission capacity are not necessarily preferable to regulatory approved capacity expansion.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 29.2003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
- Thema
-
Auctions
gas
investment
networks
regulation
Gasversorgung
Netzregulierung
Auktion
Regulierung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
McDaniel, Tanga
Neuhoff, Karsten
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- McDaniel, Tanga
- Neuhoff, Karsten
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2003