Optimal Workfare with Voluntary and Involuntary Unemployment

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies whether a benevolent government should use workfare as part of its unemployment benefit policy. We consider a population composed of employed and unemployed workers as well as individuals who do not seek employment. Job search behavior is private information implying that voluntarily unemployed individuals can claim unemployment insurance (UI) benefits intended for unemployed workers. As a consequence, pecuniary benefit schemes underinsure workers against unemployment. We show that requiring unproductive activities (workfare) in exchange for UI benefits may create a Pareto improvement by facilitating better unemployment insurance for workers, and we characterize the situations where this is the case.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 2003-15

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Thema: unemployment insurance ; workfare ; Pareto optimality ; Aktivierende Sozialhilfe ; Arbeitslosigkeit ; Pareto-Optimum

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Thustrup Kreiner, Claus ; Tranæs, Torben
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
• (wo): Copenhagen
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82040
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ