Arbeitspapier

A Discussion of Maximin

This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of maximin is illustrated from both positive and normative viewpoints. Examples are provided.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-028/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Bounded rationality
common knowledge of rationality
correlated equilibria
rationalizability
uncertainty aversion
Spieltheorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Pruzhansky, Vitaly
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Pruzhansky, Vitaly
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2004

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