Arbeitspapier
A Discussion of Maximin
This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of maximin is illustrated from both positive and normative viewpoints. Examples are provided.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-028/1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Bounded rationality
common knowledge of rationality
correlated equilibria
rationalizability
uncertainty aversion
Spieltheorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Pruzhansky, Vitaly
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2004
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Pruzhansky, Vitaly
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2004