Arbeitspapier

Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies stochastic contracts, like uncertain arbitration procedures or payments in stock options. These contracts incentivize employees without the need for payments to third parties. In addition, stochastic contracts can make the principal better off compared to deterministic contracts. My results also address the puzzle about the prevalence of labor contracts with stochastic compensation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9458

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Labor Contracts
Labor Discrimination: General
Thema
subjective evaluations
stochastic contracts
budget-balanced contracts
moral hazard
subjective performance measures
incentives

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lang, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lang, Matthias
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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