Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations

Arbeitspapier

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies stochastic contracts, like uncertain arbitration procedures or payments in stock options. These contracts incentivize employees without the need for payments to third parties. In addition, stochastic contracts can make the principal better off compared to deterministic contracts. My results also address the puzzle about the prevalence of labor contracts with stochastic compensation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9458

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Labor Contracts ; Labor Discrimination: General
• Subject: subjective evaluations ; stochastic contracts ; budget-balanced contracts ; moral hazard ; subjective performance measures ; incentives

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lang, Matthias
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/249003
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET