Arbeitspapier
Multiple membership and federal structures
We consider a model of the 'world' with several regions that may create a unified entity or be partitioned into several unions (countries). The regions have distinct preferences over policies chosen in the country to which they belong and equally share the cost of public policies. It is known that stable \political maps' or country partitions, that do not admit a threat of secession by any group of regions, may fail to exist. To rectify this problem, in line with the recent trend for an increased autonomy and various regional arrangements, we consider federal structures, where a region can simultaneously be a part of several unions. We show that, under very general conditions, there always exists a stable federal structure.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2008,41
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Public Goods
- Thema
-
Partitions
Federal Structures
Stability
Cooperative Games
Staat
Nation
Föderalismus
Kooperation
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Le Breton, Michel
Makarov, Valery
Savvateev, Alexei
Weber, Shlomo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Le Breton, Michel
- Makarov, Valery
- Savvateev, Alexei
- Weber, Shlomo
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2008
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