Arbeitspapier

Moral Norms in a Partly Compliant Society

This paper analyses competition of moral norms and institutions in a society where a fixed share of people unconditionally complies with norms and the remaining people act selfishly. Whether a person is a norm-complier or selfish is private knowledge. A model of voting-by-feet shows that those norms and institutions arise that maximize expected utility of norm-compliers, taken into account selfish players' behavior. Such complier optimal norms lead to a simple behavioral model that, when combined with preferences for equitable outcomes, is in line with the relevant stylized facts from a wide range of economic experiments, like reciprocal behavior, costly punishment, the role of intentions, giving in dictator games and concerns for social efficiency. The paper contributes to the literature on voting-by-feet, institutional design, ethics and social preferences.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 11/2006

Classification
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Subject
moral norms
social preferences
reciprocity
fairness
rule utilitarianism
voting-by-feet
cultural evolution
golden rule
social norms

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kranz, Sebastian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kranz, Sebastian
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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