Demand properties in household Nash equilibrium

Arbeitspapier

We study noncooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against noncooperative alternatives.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFS Working Papers ; No. 07/01

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Consumer Economics: Theory ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: Nash equilibrium ; Intra-household allocation ; Slutsky symmetry

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lechene, Valérie ; Preston, Ian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
• (wo): London
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2007.0701
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71604
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ