Arbeitspapier

Globalization for Sale

We study the role of firms in the political economy of trade agreements. Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we find that virtually all firms that lobby on free trade agreements (FTAs) support their ratification. Moreover, relative to non-lobbying firms, lobbying firms are larger, and more likely to be engaged in international trade and to operate in comparative advantage sectors. To rationalize these findings, we develop a model in which heterogeneous firms decide whether to lobby and how much to spend in favor or against a proposed FTA. We show that the distributional effects are asymmetric: the winners from the FTA have higher stakes in the agreement than the losers, which explains why only pro-FTA firms select into lobbying. The model also delivers predictions on the intensive margin of lobbying. In line with these predictions, we find that firms spend more supporting agreements that generate larger potential gains - in terms of the extent of the reduction of tariffs on their final goods and intermediate inputs, the depth of the agreement, and the export and sourcing potential of the FTA partners - and when politicians are less likely to be in favor of ratification.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8239

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Economic Impacts of Globalization: Microeconomic Impacts
Thema
trade agreements
endogeneous lobbying
heterogeneous firms

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Blanga-Gubbay, Michael
Conconi, Paola
Parenti, Mathieu
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Blanga-Gubbay, Michael
  • Conconi, Paola
  • Parenti, Mathieu
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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