Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities

Artikel

A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is solvable if there is a strategy-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there are no ties, or there is at least one four-way tie. (B) For any two agents i and j, if there is an object that assigns higher priority to i than j, there is also an object that assigns higher priority to j than i. We show that there are at most three types of solvable priority structures: The strict type, the house allocation with existing tenants (HET) type, where, for each object, there is at most one agent who has strictly higher priority than another agent, and the task allocation with unqualified agents (TAU) type, where, for each object, there is at most one agent who has strictly lower priority than another agent. Out of these three, only HET priority structures are shown to admit a strongly group strategy-proof and constrained efficient mechanism.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1009-1042 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Education and Research Institutions: General
• Thema: Weak priorities ; stability ; constrained efficiency ; strategy-proofness

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Ehlers, Lars H. ; Westkamp, Alexander
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2547
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197170
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ