Artikel

Competition and networks of collaboration

I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher tournament rankings. I use von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets as a solution. I find stable networks in which agents collaborate only within exclusive groups. Both an absence of intergroup collaboration and excessive intragroup collaboration lead to inefficiency. I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of efficient outcomes in winner-takes-all tournaments. I show that the use of transfers does not repair efficiency.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 13 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1077-1110 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Cooperative Games
Subject
Network
collaboration
farsighted agent
stable set
tournament

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Roketskiy, Nikita
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2492
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Roketskiy, Nikita
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2018

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