Arbeitspapier
Slouching Towards Decentralization. An Equilibrium Approach for Collective Bargaining.
Although European institutions and national governments have long pushed for a more decentralized wage bargaining structure, in some countries company or establishment-level negotiations struggle to take place. This paper offers an interpretation for that based on workers' optimal choices in an strategic framework. I construct an equilibrium matching model that explains under which conditions it is best for workers to negotiate their entire wage at sectoral level (one-tier bargaining) or to let a fraction of their salary to be negotiated at company level (two-tier bargaining). Workers' strategies do not simply depend on their own characteristics or on those of their firm, but also on the decisions of all the other employees of the sector. Three alternative Nash equilibria may occur: one-tier bargaining for all workers; two-tier bargaining for all workers; two-tier bargaining for the most productive workers and one-tier bargaining for the others. The prevalence of a specific equilibrium over others hinges on some critical factors, notably the elasticity of the matching function and the properties of the productivity distribution.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16870
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Subject
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bargaining structure
wage decentralization
collective bargaining
unions
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cardullo, Gabriele
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2024
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cardullo, Gabriele
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2024