Arbeitspapier
Independent auditors as fiscal gatekeepers
This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers' reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers' services is characterised, as well as taxpayers' and auditors' optimal behaviour. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 32.1997
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Thema
-
Law enforcement
Tax evasion
Auditing
Collateral liability
Certification
Steuerfahndung
Steuerstrafrecht
Rechnungshof
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1997
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1997