Arbeitspapier
Independent auditors as fiscal gatekeepers
This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers' reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers' services is characterised, as well as taxpayers' and auditors' optimal behaviour. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 32.1997
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Subject
-
Law enforcement
Tax evasion
Auditing
Collateral liability
Certification
Steuerfahndung
Steuerstrafrecht
Rechnungshof
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
1997
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 1997
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The role of independent fiscal policy institutions
Inflation as a fiscal limit
Permanent budget surpluses as a fiscal regime
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A Challenge for the G20: Globally Stipulated Debt Brakes and Transnational Independent Fiscal Supervisory Councils
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