Decentralized Road Investment and Pricing in a Monocentric, Multi-Jurisdictional City: Efficiency with Spillovers

Arbeitspapier

This paper shows that the inefficiency of fiscal decentralization in the presence of spillovers, a main tenet of the decentralization literature, is overturned in a particular transportation context. In a monocentric city where road (bridge) capacity is financed by budget-balancing user fees, decentralized capacity choices (made by individual zones within the city) generate the social optimum despite the presence of spillovers. This conclusion is closely tied to the famous self-financing theorem of transportation economics.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4473

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
• Subject: spillovers ; congestion ; self-financing theorem

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Brueckner, Jan K.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89779
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET