Arbeitspapier

Contracting for impure public goods: Carbon offsets and additionality

Governments contracting with private agents for the provision of an impure public good must contend with agents who would potentially supply the good absent any payments. This additionality problem is centrally important in the use of carbon offsets as part of climate change mitigation. Analyzing optimal contracts for forest carbon sequestration, an important offset category, we conduct a national-scale simulation using results from an econometric model of land-use change. The results indicate that for an increase in forest area of 50 million acres, annual government expenditures with optimal contracts are about $4 billion lower compared than under a uniform subsidy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 13.2011

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Thema
Carbon Sequestration
Incentive Contracting
Offsets
Klimaveränderung
Umweltpolitik
Kohlenstoffsenke
Wald
Öffentliches Gut
Vertragstheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mason, Charles F.
Plantinga, Andrew J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mason, Charles F.
  • Plantinga, Andrew J.
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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