Arbeitspapier

Schedulers, potentials and weak potentials in weakly acyclic games

In a number of large, important families of finite games, not only do pure-strategy Nash equilibria always exist but they are also reachable from any initial strategy profile by some sequence of myopic single-player moves to a better or best-response strategy. This weak acyclicity property is shared, for example, by all perfect-information extensive-form games, which are generally not acyclic since even sequences of best-improvement steps may cycle. Weak acyclicity is equivalent to the existence of weak potential, which unlike a potential increases along some rather than every sequence as above, as well as to the existence of an acyclic scheduler, which guarantees convergence to equilibrium by disallowing certain (improvement) moves. A number of sufficient conditions for acyclicity and weak acyclicity are known.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2013-03

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Milchtaich, Igal
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Ramat-Gan
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Milchtaich, Igal
  • Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2013

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