Arbeitspapier
The issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game
We reformulate the monetary policy model of Barro and Gordon (1983a) by using an extended game with observable delay where the hierarchy of play between the central bank and the private sector is endogenous. This allows us to endogenise the institutional setup wherein the monetary policy game takes place. We show that positive inflation may be observed due to mixed strategies rather than time inconsistency.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 489
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2003
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4805
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cellini, Roberto
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2003
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