Arbeitspapier

Non-profit organizations in a bureaucratic environment

How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bureaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3685

Classification
Wirtschaft
Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
Subject
Donated labor
intrinsic motivation
non-profit organizations
power within organizations
Nonprofit-Organisation
Arbeitsangebot
Ehrenamtliche Arbeit
Spende
Soziales Verhalten
Bürokratie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Grout, Paul A.
Schnedler, Wendelin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008100833
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Grout, Paul A.
  • Schnedler, Wendelin
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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