Arbeitspapier

Migrating football players, transfer fees and migration controls

Since the famous Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995 transfer fees for football players after moving to another club have become suspect as they are considered as an obstacle to the free movement of workers. However, in an unrestricted market free migration from football players will be Pareto efficient under special circumstances only. This paper shows that transfer fees can correct inefficient migration flows from small to large football leagues. Home-grown rules that prescribe that a certain proportion of the roster of players should be trained within the club are very blunt devices for restoring efficiency, and perform worse than transfer fee systems.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2004

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
Thema
Fußballsport
Professioneller Sport
Sportler
Arbeitsmobilität
Internationale Arbeitsmobilität
Pareto-Optimum
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Verbon, Harrie A. A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Verbon, Harrie A. A.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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