Migrating football players, transfer fees and migration controls

Arbeitspapier

Since the famous Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995 transfer fees for football players after moving to another club have become suspect as they are considered as an obstacle to the free movement of workers. However, in an unrestricted market free migration from football players will be Pareto efficient under special circumstances only. This paper shows that transfer fees can correct inefficient migration flows from small to large football leagues. Home-grown rules that prescribe that a certain proportion of the roster of players should be trained within the club are very blunt devices for restoring efficiency, and perform worse than transfer fee systems.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2004

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers ; Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
• Subject: Fußballsport ; Professioneller Sport ; Sportler ; Arbeitsmobilität ; Internationale Arbeitsmobilität ; Pareto-Optimum ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Verbon, Harrie A. A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26049
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET