Artikel

Advertisement-financed credit ratings

This paper investigates the incentives of a credit rating agency (CRA) to generate accurate ratings under an advertisement-based business model. To this end, we study a two-period endogenous reputation model in which a CRA can increase the precision of its ratings by exerting effort. The CRA receives a revenue not from rating fees, as is standard in the literature, but through online advertising. We show that the advertisement-based business model provides sufficient incentives for the CRA to improve the precision of signals at intermediate levels of reputation. Furthermore, we identify conditions under which truthful reporting is incentive compatible.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Journal of Economics and Finance ; ISSN: 1938-9744 ; Volume: 46 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 188-206 ; New York, NY: Springer US

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Subject
Credit rating agencies
Rating precision
Information acquisition
Advertisement
Reputation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun
Siemering, Christian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer US
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1007/s12197-021-09562-8
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun
  • Siemering, Christian
  • Springer US

Time of origin

  • 2021

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