Arbeitspapier
Monetary Policy with Reserves and CBDC: Optimality, Equivalence, and Politics
We analyze policy in a two-tiered monetary system. Noncompetitive banks issue deposits while the central bank issues reserves and a retail CBDC. Monies differ with respect to operating costs and liquidity. We map the framework into a baseline business cycle model with “pseudo wedges” and derive optimal policy rules: Spreads satisfy modified Friedman rules and deposits must be taxed or subsidized. We generalize the Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) result on the macro irrelevance of CBDC but show that a deposit based payment system requires higher taxes. The model implies annual implicit subsidies to U.S. banks of up to 0:8 percent of GDP during the period 1999-2017.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8712
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Monetary Policy
- Thema
-
reserves
deposits
central bank digital currency
monetary policy
Friedman rule
equivalence
Ramsey policy
bank profits
money creation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Niepelt, Dirk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Niepelt, Dirk
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2020
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