Arbeitspapier
Capital Taxation under Political Constraints
This paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform. A policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough political coalition supports reform; thus, sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future. We find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or U-shaped, so that savings are subsidized for the poor and/or the middle class but are taxed for the rich. U-shaped capital taxes always emerge when the salient reform threat consists of radically redistributing capital and individuals' political behavior is purely determined by economic motives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5098
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
wealth inequality
capital taxation
coalition formation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Scheuer, Florian
Wolitzky, Alexander
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Scheuer, Florian
- Wolitzky, Alexander
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014