Arbeitspapier

Capital Taxation under Political Constraints

This paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform. A policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough political coalition supports reform; thus, sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future. We find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or U-shaped, so that savings are subsidized for the poor and/or the middle class but are taxed for the rich. U-shaped capital taxes always emerge when the salient reform threat consists of radically redistributing capital and individuals' political behavior is purely determined by economic motives.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5098

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
wealth inequality
capital taxation
coalition formation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Scheuer, Florian
Wolitzky, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Scheuer, Florian
  • Wolitzky, Alexander
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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