Aristotle on the Beginning of Animal Life and Soul Activities

Abstract: For Aristotle, animals, by contrast to plants, possess a perceptual soul. However, there is disagreement concerning the point at which the perceptual soul is acquired, for him. On one influential interpretation, Aristotle thinks that the perceptual soul is acquired not during the initial formation of the embryo, but at some later stage of its development. On such interpretations of Aristotle’s view, the newly formed embryo is not yet an actual animal, but a plant-like living being or even inanimate matter. We argue, by contrast, that Aristotle views the embryo, from the very beginning, as an actual animal exercising basic nutritive and perceptual functions. We show that this interpretation is consistent with Aristotle’s views on embryogenesis in the GA, HA, PA, and the Metaphysics.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Aristotle on the Beginning of Animal Life and Soul Activities ; volume:56 ; number:3 ; year:2023 ; pages:587-619 ; extent:33 ; Apeiron ; 56, Heft 3 (2023), 587-619 (gesamt 33)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Schriefl, Anna ; Segev, Mor

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/apeiron-2022-0084
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023071214295800990735
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 14.08.2025, 10:56 AM CEST