Arbeitspapier
Bank Regulation and Sovereign Risk: A Paradox
This paper investigates the impact of banking prudential regulation on sovereign risk. We show that prudential regulation reduces sovereign risk and induces governments to spend more. As a result, countries with tight prudential regulation have lower primary budget balances and accumulate more government debt over time. We find that prudential regulation reduces private debt, while paradoxically increasing government debt. We explore several explanations for this paradox. Our results suggest that prudential regulation enables governments to accumulate debt because they improve the nation's credit rating and its borrowing conditions in sovereign bond markets.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10434
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
-
banking regulation
fiscal policy
macroprudential policy
sovereign debt
sovereign risk
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Afonso, António
Teixeira, André
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Afonso, António
- Teixeira, André
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2023