Arbeitspapier

Bank Regulation and Sovereign Risk: A Paradox

This paper investigates the impact of banking prudential regulation on sovereign risk. We show that prudential regulation reduces sovereign risk and induces governments to spend more. As a result, countries with tight prudential regulation have lower primary budget balances and accumulate more government debt over time. We find that prudential regulation reduces private debt, while paradoxically increasing government debt. We explore several explanations for this paradox. Our results suggest that prudential regulation enables governments to accumulate debt because they improve the nation's credit rating and its borrowing conditions in sovereign bond markets.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10434

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
banking regulation
fiscal policy
macroprudential policy
sovereign debt
sovereign risk

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Afonso, António
Teixeira, André
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Afonso, António
  • Teixeira, André
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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