Arbeitspapier

Career risk and market discipline in asset management

We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suffer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imputed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these results can be ascribed to reputation loss rather than bad luck. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CFS Working Paper Series ; No. 602

Classification
Wirtschaft
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Subject
careers
hedge funds
asset managers
market discipline
scarring effects

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ellul, Andrew
Pagano, Marco
Scognamiglio, Annalisa
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2018

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-473495
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ellul, Andrew
  • Pagano, Marco
  • Scognamiglio, Annalisa
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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