Artikel

Time-consistent optimal fiscal policy over the business cycle

This paper examines a dynamic stochastic economy with a benevolent government that cannot commit to its future policies. I consider equilibria that are time-consistent and allow for history-dependent strategies. A new numerical algorithm is developed to solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs. For a baseline economy calibrated to the U.S. economy, the capital income tax with the highest social welfare is slightly procyclical, while the labor income tax is countercyclical. Compared with the data, this equilibrium provides a better account of the cyclical properties of U.S. tax policy than other solutions that abstract from history dependence. The welfare cost of no commitment is about 0.22% of aggregate consumption as compared to the Ramsey allocation with full commitment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 189-221 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Optimal fiscal policy
business cycle
recursive game theory
time consistency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Feng, Zhigang
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3982/QE370
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Feng, Zhigang
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)