Arbeitspapier

Hazardous activities and civil strict liability: The regulator's dilemma

This paper addresses the conditions for setting up strict civil liability schemes. For that it compares the social efficiency of two main civil liability regimes usually enforced to protect the environment: the strict liability regime and the capped strict liability scheme. First, it shows that the regulator faces an effective dilemma when he has to enforce one of these schemes. This because the social cost of a severe harm (and the associated optimum care effort) is determined independently of any liability regime. This independency has economic consequences. First, victims and polluters pit one against another about the liability regime that the government should enforce. Hence, financially constrained polluters prefer the ceiling of responsibilities while victims wish to extend the amount of redress under a standard strict liability. Economic criteria for enforcing a regime rather than another one are lacking. Second, the paper shows that implementing civil strict liability rules may be done by setting up care standards as for instance in the nuclear or the maritime sectors and demanding to the injurers to comply with them. We show that this goal can be achieved by resorting to some friendly monitoring corresponding to frequent random controls with low fines rather than few controls that should involve heavy fines.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 21.2011

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Sustainable Development
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Thema
Environment
Strict Liability
Ex-Ante Regulation
Ex-Post Liability
Judgment-Proof
Environment Law
CERCLA
Environmental Liability

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mondello, Gérard
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mondello, Gérard
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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