Socially optimal sustainability standards with non-consequentialist ("warm glow") investors

Arbeitspapier

Agencies around the world are in the process of developing taxonomies and standards for sustainable (or ESG) investment products. A key assumption in our model is that of non-consequentialist private investors (households) who derive a "warm glow" decisional utility when purchasing an investment product that is labelled as sustainable. We ask when such labelling is socially beneÖcial even when the social planner can impose a minimum standard on investment and production. In a model of Önancial constraints (Holmström and Tirole 1997), which we close to include consumer surplus, we also determine the optimal labelling threshold and show how its stringency is a§ected by determinants such as the prevalence of warm-glow investor preferences, the presence of social network e§ects, or the relevance of Önancial constraints at the industry level.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 346

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Sustainability ; ESG ; green financing ; labelling

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Inderst, Roman ; Opp, Markus
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
• (where): Frankfurt a. M.
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/251783
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET