Arbeitspapier

Projective Paternalism

We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others’ choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. We consider several hypotheses concerning CAs’ motives. A conventional behavioral welfarist acts as a correctly informed social planner; a mistakes-projective paternalist removes options she wishes she could reject when choosing for herself; an ideals-projective paternalist seeks to align others’ choices with her own aspirations. Ideals-projective paternalism provides the best explanation for interventions in the laboratory and rationalizes support for actual paternalistic policies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7762

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation
Public Economics: General
Thema
paternalism
libertarianism
welfare economics
experiment
false consensus bias

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ambuehl, Sandro
Bernheim, B. Douglas
Ockenfels, Axel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ambuehl, Sandro
  • Bernheim, B. Douglas
  • Ockenfels, Axel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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