Arbeitspapier
Projective Paternalism
We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others’ choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. We consider several hypotheses concerning CAs’ motives. A conventional behavioral welfarist acts as a correctly informed social planner; a mistakes-projective paternalist removes options she wishes she could reject when choosing for herself; an ideals-projective paternalist seeks to align others’ choices with her own aspirations. Ideals-projective paternalism provides the best explanation for interventions in the laboratory and rationalizes support for actual paternalistic policies.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7762
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation
Public Economics: General
- Subject
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paternalism
libertarianism
welfare economics
experiment
false consensus bias
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ambuehl, Sandro
Bernheim, B. Douglas
Ockenfels, Axel
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2019
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ambuehl, Sandro
- Bernheim, B. Douglas
- Ockenfels, Axel
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2019