Arbeitspapier

Projective Paternalism

We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others’ choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. We consider several hypotheses concerning CAs’ motives. A conventional behavioral welfarist acts as a correctly informed social planner; a mistakes-projective paternalist removes options she wishes she could reject when choosing for herself; an ideals-projective paternalist seeks to align others’ choices with her own aspirations. Ideals-projective paternalism provides the best explanation for interventions in the laboratory and rationalizes support for actual paternalistic policies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7762

Classification
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation
Public Economics: General
Subject
paternalism
libertarianism
welfare economics
experiment
false consensus bias

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ambuehl, Sandro
Bernheim, B. Douglas
Ockenfels, Axel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ambuehl, Sandro
  • Bernheim, B. Douglas
  • Ockenfels, Axel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2019

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