Arbeitspapier
A single espresso, please! Rationalizing espresso price dispersion across Italian cities
This paper aims at providing an explanation of the observed espresso price dispersion across major Italian cities. The empirical evidence suggests a positive relationships between the average espresso price in a city and the number of coffee shops (normalized for the adult population) operating in that city. This finding is shown to be robust after controlling for GDP per capita and consumers.price index. We provide an interpretation of the empirical findings relying on a model of price competition delivering a continuum of Nash equilibria, where firms adjust the mark-up to offset the negative effect of any increase in their number.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1017
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Delbono, Flavio
Dipoppa, Gemma
Lambertini, Luca
Reggiani, Carlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4311
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Delbono, Flavio
- Dipoppa, Gemma
- Lambertini, Luca
- Reggiani, Carlo
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2015
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