Arbeitspapier

Learning and Implementation on the Internet

We address the problem of learning and implementation on the Internet. When agents play repeated games in distributed environments like the Internet, they have very limited {\em a priori} information about the other players and the payoff matrix, and the play can be highly asynchronous. Consequently, standard solution concepts like Nash equilibria, or even the serially undominated set, do not apply in such a setting. To construct more appropriate solution concepts, we first describe the essential properties that constitute ``reasonable'' learning behavior in distributed environments. We then study the convergence behavior of such algorithms; these results lead us to propose rather non traditional solutions concepts for this context. Finally, we discuss implementation of social choice functions with these solution concepts.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1998-21

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Implementation
Internet
Learning

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Friedman, Eric
Shenker, Scott
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
(wo)
New Brunswick, NJ
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Friedman, Eric
  • Shenker, Scott
  • Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1998

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