Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the effects of supervisors’ (i.e., regulators and judges) selection rules on regulated prices. A checks and balances’ regulatory review process strengthens the role of the judicial power and election increases the populism of implicitly motivated supervisors. Election arises when the risk related to expropriation of sunk investments and the inter-party distance are lower. Employing U.S. electric power market’s data, the empirical evidence strongly confirms these predictions. Indeed, when treated as endogenous, only the election of administrative law judges and not the one of regulators significantly lowers the level of electricity rates. Moreover a more effective supervision technology shows a marginal negative effect on regulated rates as well.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 109.2006

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Regulated Industries and Administrative Law ; Economics of Regulation ; Energy and the Macroeconomy
• Thema: Election ; Agency ; Judges ; Regulation ; Electricity ; Regulierung ; Staatliche Preispolitik ; Elektrizitätswirtschaft ; Theorie ; USA

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Guerriero, Carmine
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74008
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ