Artikel

Giving in Unilaterally Risky Dictator Games: A Model of Allocation Decisions Under Existential Threat

This study reports experimental results from variations of the standard dictator game that capture different variants of unilaterally risky allocation decisions where only the dictator's payoff is subject to risk. Thereby, it addresses the question of whether decisions under existential threat, modeled as a risk to the dictator's payoff, encourage or discourage generosity in individual decision making. It aims at bridging the gap between experimental economics and psychological research on the behavioral impact of mortality salience. Results show that giving in unilterally risky dictator games increases with the risk imposed on the dictator's payoff. Risk aversion falls short of explaining the increase in generosity. Instead, the observed behavior is most likely motivated by a preference for efficient capital employment. Moreover, dictator games prove to be an apt model for decisions under existential threat.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Junior Management Science (JUMS) ; ISSN: 2942-1861 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 35-49

Klassifikation
Management
Thema
dictator games
risky decisions
mortality salience
generosity
existential threat

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kovatsch, Sarah Franziska
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Junior Management Science e. V.
(wo)
Planegg
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.5282/jums/v5i1pp35-49
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Kovatsch, Sarah Franziska
  • Junior Management Science e. V.

Entstanden

  • 2020

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