Arbeitspapier

Information acquisition during a Dutch auction

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that, if the number of bidders is large, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction.

ISBN
978-952-462-589-0
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 7/2010

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Miettinen, Paavo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Finland
(where)
Helsinki
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Miettinen, Paavo
  • Bank of Finland

Time of origin

  • 2010

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