Arbeitspapier
Information acquisition during a Dutch auction
In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that, if the number of bidders is large, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction.
- ISBN
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978-952-462-589-0
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 7/2010
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Miettinen, Paavo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Bank of Finland
- (where)
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Helsinki
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Miettinen, Paavo
- Bank of Finland
Time of origin
- 2010