Arbeitspapier

Information acquisition during a Dutch auction

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction when the bidders that are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in the setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that when the number of bidders is large the Dutch auction produces more revenue than the first price auction.

ISBN
978-952-462-791-7
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 8/2012

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Miettinen, Paavo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Finland
(where)
Helsinki
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Miettinen, Paavo
  • Bank of Finland

Time of origin

  • 2012

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