Arbeitspapier
Dynamic inconsistency, commitment, and welfare in strategic settings
The choices of a dynamically inconsistent individual depend on whether she commits to consumption ahead of time or chooses consumption in the moment. In individual-choice settings, it is normatively ambiguous whether such an individual's choices with commitment or in the moment are "better". This impasse can be overcome in settings in which dynamically inconsistent individuals interact strategically. Policy implications are discussed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 954
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
- Thema
-
dynamic inconsistency
commitment
welfare
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ivanov, Asen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (wo)
-
London
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ivanov, Asen
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Entstanden
- 2023
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