Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904

Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

In this paper, I use a slightly modified version of the Becker–Stigler model of corrupt behavior to explain bureaucratic political involvement. Since bureaucrats prefer higher rewards and not to support losing candidates, we expect them to become politically involved near elections – when rewards are expected to be higher, and information more abundant. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I employ differences-in-means and differences-in-differences techniques to estimate the effect of electoral proximity on the political involvement of justices of the peace in the city of Buenos Aires in 1904. I find a large, positive, and highly local effect of electoral proximity on their political involvement, with no appreciable impact in the months before or after elections. (author's abstract)

Object Details

• ISSN: 1868-4890
• Extent: Seite(n): 69-94
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal of Politics in Latin America, 8(1)

Classification and Topics

• Subject: Staatsformen und Regierungssysteme ; Politikwissenschaft ; Geschichte ; Staat, staatliche Organisationsformen ; Sozialgeschichte, historische Sozialforschung ; politische Willensbildung, politische Soziologie, politische Kultur ; Argentinien ; politisches System ; politische Elite ; politische Macht ; politischer Einfluss ; Korruption ; Bürokratie ; politische Institution ; politischer Akteur ; Wahl ; Betrug ; Wahlkampf ; Wahlergebnis ; historische Analyse

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Figueroa, Valentin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Deutschland
• (when): 2016

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-9409
• Last update: 2024-06-21T16:26:33+0200